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In July 2011, a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel weighed in on an 
emerging issue of international law. In Flomo v. Firestone National 
Rubber Co.,1 Judge Richard Posner, writing for the majority, held that 
corporations can be subjected to civil liability for international law 
violations in U.S. courts.2 Violation of international law claims are 
brought under a 222-year-old statute enacted by the First Congress of 
the United States—the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).3 The Seventh 
Circuit’s decision was significant in light of its stark contrast with the 
Second Circuit’s recent decision Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.4 
In Kiobel, the Second Circuit held that corporations cannot be 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; president, International Law Moot Court Honor Society; Northwestern 
University, B.A., Political Science & International Studies, June 2008. 
1 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011). The 
joining judges were Judge Daniel A. Manion and Judge William J. Bauer.  
2 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1021. 
3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The statute is also known as the Alien Tort Claims 
Act (ATCA). 
4 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2010), 
reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
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subjected to potential liability under the ATS since that statute was not 
meant to extend to juridical persons.5 The circuit split arises from 
scattered ATS litigation across the country, and more importantly, has 
caught the attention of the Supreme Court, which will hear an appeal 
from the Second Circuit’s opinion later during the 2011 term.6 
The U.S. Supreme Court has only ruled on the ATS once in the 
2004 case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.7 Sosa required U.S. courts 
hearing ATS cases to engage in a merits review ensuring that the 
underlying breach of international law is in fact a well-established 
norm of international law.8 However, the Supreme Court never ruled 
on who can be sued under the ATS, and the statute is silent on the 
matter. The significance of haling corporations into American courts 
by alleging violations of international law lies with the Court’s 
requirement, under Sosa, to examine whether the underlying tort is a 
well-established norm of international law.9 When a plaintiff sues a 
foreign public official for the commission of a tort, a court will 
consider whether certain torts such as torture, summary execution, and 
arbitrary detention constitute breaches of international law. But, when 
a plaintiff hales a corporation into court, the range of international 
torts the court can consider will be significantly larger—a mere 
function of the corporation’s ability to perform actions on a much 
larger scale than a single individual. When a corporation can be sued 
under the ATS, the courts are free to consider whether large-scale torts 
such as child labor or cultural genocide are violations of international 
law.10  
                                                 
5 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145. 
6 See Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Supreme Court Grants Cert in Kiobel, 
Deciding to Hear Corporate ATS Case, INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC (Oct. 17, 
2011, 11:35 PM), http://harvardhumanrights.wordpress.com/tag/corporate-liability. 
7 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
8 Id. at 724. 
9 Id. 
10 See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d. Cir. 2002), where 
Ecuadorian and Peruvian citizens brought ATS claims against the oil corporation for 
environmental damage and personal injury stemming from Texaco’s oil activities in 
the region.  
29 
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Revisionists argue that allowing American jurists to make these 
types of judgments moves the U.S. in the wrong direction.11 Indeed, 
an important question remains whether domestic courts are the 
appropriate forum to bring corporations to liability. However, this 
question is easily answered by those who view international law as 
working in tangent with domestic law, such as Judge Posner. To these 
jurists, the issue at hand is one of remedies, and thus one which under 
international law is properly addressed at the domestic level.12 It is 
undeniable that under the current state of affairs, the ATS is moving its 
way into the domestic courts one circuit at a time and bringing 
corporate liability with it.  
This note examines the recent Seventh Circuit decision of Flomo 
v. Firestone National Rubber, and analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s 
rationale for holding that corporations may be subjected to civil 
liability under the ATS. While the rationale employed is 
unconventional for this area of litigation, it comes as a new analysis 
and ultimately squares with other circuit opinions holding that 
corporations can be subject to liability under the statute. Part I of this 
note provides an historical background of the ATS, dating back to its 
inception in the Judiciary Act of 1789, fast-forwarding to its revival in 
1980 with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, and ending with more recent ATS 
litigation cases. Part II dissects the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Flomo v. Firestone and the court’s rationale for siding with the 
corporate liability camp over the corporate immunity camp. Finally, 
Section III argues that the Seventh Circuit’s decision is legally correct 







                                                 
11 See generally Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2011). 
12 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013,1019 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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A. Introduction to the ATS & the Case that Launched its Modern Use 
  
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) was born with the Judiciary Act of 
1789.13 The ATS provides that “district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”14 Thus, 
the ATS allows non-U.S. citizens to seek financial redress from 
individuals within U.S. borders for violations of international law 
whether those individuals are U.S. citizens or not.15  
 
1. Legislative History of the Act  
and the Absence of Reference to “Defendants” 
 
While modern courts have sought clarification of the ATS’s 
original intent in the legislative history of the statute, such history is 
scarce. However, the Congressional Resolution of 1781 is insightful.16 
The Resolution shows the First Congress’ desire to acquire the 
                                                 
13 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  
14 See id. The term “law of nations” is interchangeable with customary 
international law. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2nd Cir. 
1980). 
15 On its face the ATS appears to be a jurisdictional statute only, but debate 
over whether the ATS provides foreign plaintiffs with an independent cause of 
action was resolved in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain when the Supreme Court noted that, 
“the jurisdictional grant is best read as have been enacted on the understanding that 
the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of 
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.” 542 
U.S. 692, 724 (2004). The Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa now requires courts to 
entertain a merits review of the existence of a customary international law violation 
to establish jurisdiction and proceed in a case. Id. The standard for this merits review 
is discussed below in Part (I)(A)(4)(a) and the accompanying footnotes.  
16 For a complete discussion on the historical origins of the ATS, including the 
text of the 1781 Congressional Report, see  William S. Dodge, The Historical 
Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS 
INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996). 
31 
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authority to punish international law violations, which at the time, 
consisted of a few enumerated causes of action.17 Originally, the intent 
was to authorize criminal sanctions for individuals committing these 
violations.18 But, it followed that civil sanctions would be “an entirely 
logical addition.”19 The recommendations within the 1781 
Congressional Resolution were historically succeeded by what became 
known as the Marbois affair.20 In 1784, a French citizen publically 
assaulted the French Consul General, Francis Barbe Marbois, in 
Philadelphia.21 The assailant was criminally punished under state law, 
but the U.S. Government had no federal recourse to offer the Consul 
General since it was limited by powers expressly delegated to it by 
Congress.22 Four years later, in 1788, another similar incident 
occurred when a constable in New York City entered the Dutch 
Ambassador’s home and attacked him.23 The assailant in this attack 
was also criminally punished by the state court, but again no federal 
remedy was available to the Ambassador.24 The incidents prompted 
recommendations to Congress by the Secretary General, John Jay, for 
explicit laws providing a federal remedy to the victims of such acts.25 
The numerous congressional recommendations of the 1780s were 
finally codified in the Judiciary Act of 1789.26 
 
 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 226–27. 
19 Id. at 228. 
20 Id.  at 229. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 229–30. 
23 Id. at 230. 
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.; see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND 
ARBITRATION 827 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that an apparent reason in enacting the ATS 
was to “uphold the standing of the United States as a new but reliable member of the 
international community” by affording foreign aliens redress if injured by a U.S. 
citizen or resident who was violating international law). 
32 
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2. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala Resuscitates the ATS 
 
Despite the ATS’s animated history, for the first two hundred 
years of its existence, use of the Statute was sparse. ATS plaintiffs 
established jurisdiction under the act only twice.27 This lack of use 
changed in 1980 when the now-celebrated case of Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala launched a modern use of the statute.28 In Filartiga, two 
Paraguayan plaintiffs filed a wrongful death suit against a former 
Paraguayan government official.29 The plaintiffs, a political opponent 
of the Paraguayan government and his daughter, claimed that a 
government official had kidnapped, tortured, and murdered a 
seventeen-year old boy, who was the son and brother to the 
plaintiffs.30 Their complaint alleged that the government official 
violated various international law statutes when he tortured the boy to 
31death.  Their complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages 
                                                 
27 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004); see also Kenneth 
C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Claims: Inquiries into the Alien 
Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & POL. 1, 4, n. 15 (1985); see also Knowles, 
supra note 11, at 1127 (noting that the ATS was invoked two dozen times from 
1789 ly twice). 
on back to Paraguay, Dr. Filartiga and his 
daug
–1980, but established jurisdiction on
28 Knowles, supra note 11, at 1127. 
29 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d. Cir. 1980). 
30 Dr. Joel Filartiga had been a staunch opponent of the Paraguayan President 
Alfedo Stroesnner and of his government. Id. After Joelito Filartiga was murdered, 
Dolly Filartiga, Dr. Filartiga’s daughter, fled to Washington D.C. and sought 
political asylum. Id. Dr. Filartiga followed and remained with her. Id. Thereafter, 
Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, 
and suspected murderer of Dr. Filartiga’s son, came to the United States on a 
visitor’s visa. Id. at 879. He overstayed the visa and remained unlawfully in the 
United States with his girlfriend whom had also left Paraguay. Id. Upon finding out 
that Pena-Irala was within U.S. boundaries, Dr. Filartiga and his daughter notified 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of Pena-Irala’s illegal presence in 
the country. Id. The INS arrested Pena-Irala for unlawfully overstaying his visitor’s 
visa, and while he awaited deportati
hter filed a complaint. Id. at 878. 
31 The complaint included violations of the United Nations Charter, the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration Against 
Torture, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and other 
33 
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of over $10,000,000.32 The complaint established jurisdiction over the 
claim through 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and under the ATS.33 While the 
district court denied jurisdiction and found for the defendant, on 
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded.34 
The Second Circuit held that the ATS provided U.S. courts 
 has rarely been the basis for 
hile the Filartiga court noted that the ATS was written as a 
juris
                                                                                                                  
with the jurisdiction to hear suits brought by foreign plaintiffs 
against foreign defendants for international law violations.35 
Writing for the unanimous Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Judge Kaufman explained that  
[a]lthough the Alien Tort Statute
jurisdiction during its history, in light of the foregoing 
discussion, there can be little doubt that this action is properly 
brought in federal court. This is undeniably an action by an 




diction-granting statute, the court also embraced the statute’s 
elements.37 The elements, as highlighted by the court, are: (1) an 
action by an alien (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of 
nations.38 Thus, a court is first required to determine on the merits 
whether the alleged violation in the complaint is in fact a recognized 
violation of customary international law or a breach of an international 
 
pertinent declarations documents, and practices that constitute customary 
international law, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as well as United States Constitution Art. II, sec. 
2 and the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 879. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 889. 
35 Id. at 887. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. (“[W]e believe it is sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not 
as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for 
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treaty.39 Indeed, in Filartiga, the court held that torture was a violation 
of international law.40 
 
3. Opposition to and Congressional Approval  
of Filartiga’s Holding 
 
The Filartiga decision drew fire from jurists who did not find it fit 
for American domestic judges to be determining which actions 
constituted violations of international law under ATS litigation.41 
While Filartiga gave renewed and modern life to the ATS, it was but 
one court and one holding—subject to interpretation and backlash. 
Originalists, also known as Revisionists, took issue with the 
correctness of Filartiga’s holding.42 In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, a D.C. Circuit case decided four years after Filartiga, Judge 
Bork objected to Filartiga’s merits review process in his concurring 
                                                 
39 The court engages in this determination in Filartiga as well as in Flomo. Compare 
the language in Filartiga: “[T]he treaties and accords cited above, as well as express 
foreign policy of our own government, all make it clear that international law 
confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-à-vis their own governments. While 
the ultimate scope of those rights will be a subject for continuing refinement and 
elaboration, we hold that the right to be free from torture is now among them.” 630 
F.2d at 884, with Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1024 (7th. 
Cir. 2011) (“[I]n short, we have not been given an adequate basis for inferring a 
violation of customary international law, bearing in mind the Supreme Court’s 
insistence on caution in recognizing new norms of customary international law in 
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute”). 
40 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.  
41 See generally Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (limiting violations of customary international law for purposes of ATS 
litigation to those existing in 1789 when the Act was enacted). For an additional 
perspective on Judge Bork’s opinion on using international law to interpret 
constitutional provisions, see JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS 
ACTORS PROCESS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH 296, (3d. ed. 2010) (“Judge 
Robert Bork argue[s] that the [Supreme] Court’s citations to foreign and 
international law to the context of constitutional interpretation are ‘risible,’ ‘absurd,’ 
and ‘flabbergasting.’”).  
42 Dodge, supra note 16, at 223.  
35 
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opinion.43 Judge Bork argued that the ATS should be limited only to 
the causes of action that existed when the ATS was enacted in 1789.44 
A similar position would be adopted almost 20 years later by Justice 
Scalia in his concurrence in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.45 The 
opposition to Filartiga’s holding stems from the understanding that the 
drafters of the ATS intended that causes of action be found in the 
federal common law of tort.46 Judge Bork opposed expansion of ATS 
causes of action,47 and Justice Scalia claims that Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins effectively kills the ATS unless Congress creates a cause of 
action for the s 48tatute.   
o 
U.S. law.  
 
                                                
Despite these Revisionist positions in the case law, Congress 
passed the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) in 1992.49 The 
TVPA, an act similar to the ATS, not only codified the Second 
Circuit’s holding in Filartiga by creating an express cause of action 
for victims of torture and extrajudicial killing, but extended the right to 
sue to U.S. citizens.50 Furthermore, Congress intended for the TVPA 
to supplement the ATS, not to replace it.51  The Congressional 
enactment of the TVPA is therefore, crucial to understanding the 
Congress’ accepting view of the ATS, and its increasing incision int
 
 
43 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801(Bork, J., concurring). 
44 See id. at 815 (Bork, J., concurring). 
45 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 746 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
46 Id. at 721. 
47 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813 (citation omitted) (Bork, J., concurring). 
48 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 746. 
49 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
50 Dodge, supra note 16, at 224 n.18.  
51 Kadic v. Kardazic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), noting:Congress indicated 
that the Alien Tort Statute ‘has other uses and should not be replaced,’ because 
[‘]Claims based on torture and summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions 
that may appropriately be covered [by the Alien Tort Act]. That statute should 
remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in 
the future into rules of customary international law.[’] 
36 
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4. The Supreme Court Examines the ATS:  
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
 
In addition to Congress’ enactment of the TVPA, the U.S. 
Supreme Court was able to opine on the ATS in its 2004 case of Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain.52 In Sosa, the Supreme Court examined the basis 
on which the ATS accords lower courts the jurisdiction to hear 
customary international law violation claims.53 Far from overturning 
it, the Supreme Court gave the ATS a green light. In a sense, the 
majority was vying to keep the ATS alive while the concurrence 
militated for the statute’s demise, or at the very least for congressional 
approval. The Supreme Court’s Sosa holding set out the test that 
would be employed by subsequent reviewing courts.54 Therefore, 
understanding Sosa’s holding and reasoning is important to understand 
the current debate surrounding corporate liability under the ATS. 
 
a. The Holding 
 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the ATS was enacted to 
recognize private causes of action for violations of international law 
norms.55 However, the Court found that the ATS allowed for an 
expansion of actions beyond those defined to be breaches of 
international law in 1789—piracy, infringement on rights of 
                                                 
52 Sosa originated in the Ninth Circuit, and involved DEA agents who hired 
Mexican nationals (including Sosa) to capture a Mexican physician, Alvarez, who 
was wanted in the United States for the torture and murder of an American DEA 
official. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Sosa and other men abducted Alvarez from his 
Mexico home and brought him across the border to El Paso where federal officers 
arrested him. Id. at 698. Alvarez went to trial on the charges and the district court 
granted his Motion for Acquittal. Id. Alvarez then brought suit against Sosa, five 
other unnamed Mexican officials, and five DEA officers under the ATS for violation 
of international law. Id. The district court granted Alvarez $25,000 in damages. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 699. 
53 See generally id. at 712–21 (Section III.A). 
54 See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 3541, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1121 (2010). 
55 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
37 
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ambassadors, and violations of safe conduct56—so long as lower 
courts were cautious when determining which causes of action are 
viable breaches of international law.57 The Court stated: “[T]he 
judicial power [to recognize actionable international norms] should be 
exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to 
vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international 
norms today.”58 While the Supreme Court made clear that modern 
claims brought under the ATS go beyond 18th-century definition of 
international law violations, it set out a cautious standard for this 
merits review, limiting actionable international law violations to those 
adhering to a specific standard: “We think the courts should require 
any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century 
paradigms we have recognized.”59 The Supreme Court further noted 
that “federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal 
common law for violations of any international law norm with less 
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 
historical paradigms familiar § 1350 was enacted”60 Accordingly, the 
Court gave the ATS a malleability to develop at the same pace that 
internationally accepted norms developed. It gave its approval without 





                                                 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 729. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 725. The Court reiterated its position, stating, “Whatever the ultimate 
criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under § 1350, we are 
persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal 
common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content 
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when 
§ 1350 was enacted.” Id. at 732. 
60 Id.  
38 
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b. The Reasoning 
 
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter laid out four principle 
reasons why the ATS accorded lower courts jurisdiction over 
international law violation claims.61 First, he noted that when the ATS 
was enacted, the First Congress was aware of a limited set of actions 
that constituted the “law of nations.”62 These international law norms 
were recognized in federal common law at the time.63 Next, Justice 
Souter relied on historic accounts to note that the ATS was meant to 
give civil remedies to common law claims arising from international 
law.64 He reasoned that the ATS was “intended to have practical effect 
the moment it became law” even if the language in the statute was 
solely jurisdictional.65 Justice Souter concluded that based on the 
response to the ATS, and to the historical debate surrounding it, the 
jurisdictional grant was enacted on the understanding that the common 
law could provide a cause of action based on the international law 
violations that existed at the time.66 Thirdly, Justice Souter pointed out 
that Congress has not amended the ATS or limited civil common law 
power under it.67 Finally, Justice Souter noted that domestic law 
recognizes international law,68 and that international law is one of the 




                                                 
61 Id. at 712–22. 
62 Id. at 715. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 721. 
65 Id. at 724. 
66 Id.; see Part (I)(A)(4)(c) below (discussing Scalia’s opposing argument that 
Erie has repudiated common law as a cause of action in American jurisprudence). 
67 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
68 Id. at 729-30 (citation omitted). 
69 Id. at 730 (citing to Tex. Indus. Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 
630, 641 (1981)).  
39 
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c. The Concurring Opinion 
 
The majority opinion’s rationale in Sosa was by no means 
unanimous. Justice Scalia’s concurrence is noteworthy because it 
sheds light on the academic debate that surrounds this piece of 
legislation.70 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, adopting an 
Originalist point of view, highlighted his concern that the ATS rests at 
odds with Erie Railroad Co., v. Tompkins.71 According to Justice 
Scalia, the ATS is solely a jurisdictional statute and is itself useless 
without a congressional grant making international law violations 
actionable claims.72 Justice Scalia explained that Erie did away with 
general common law, and that post-Erie, a few exceptions such as 
admiralty law and Bivens claims have been given the status of “federal 
common law.”73 To Justice Scalia, the real issue is whether the ATS 
should be a basis for a new type of federal common law as it can no 
longer exist under general common law and by itself does not create a 
cause of action: “The general common law was the old door. We do 
not close that door today for the deed was done in Erie. Federal 
common law is the new door. The question is not whether the door 
will be left ajar, but whether the Court will open it.”74 To Justice 
Scalia, the answer to that question is inevitably a negative one. Justice 
Scalia discussed how the only approximation to the creation of a new 
federal common law for ATS would be Bivens75 and how even Bivens 
is “a relic of the heady days when this Court assumed common-law 
powers to create causes of action.”76 He also highlighted his concern 
for the Court to be the entity to develop new federal common law: “In 
                                                 
70 See generally Knowles, supra note 11. 
71 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
72 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 747, 750. 
73 Id. at 741. Federal common law being judge-created law based on a 
congressional grant aiming to protect vital federal interests. Id.  
74 Id. at 746 (citations omitted). 
75 See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 
(creating a federal cause of action for civil rights violations). 
76 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 742. 
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holding open the possibility that judges may create rights where 
Congress has not authorized them to do so, the Court countenances 
judicial occupation of a domain that belongs to the people’s 
representatives.”77 In short, the whole idea to Justice Scalia is 
“nonsense upon stilts.”78 
With Justice Scalia militating against the continued life of the 
ATS, Sosa created a standard on which lower courts could proceed to 
hear cases involving violations of international law.79 The one thing 
Sosa made clear was that the violation must be recognized by civilized 
nations.80 The norm must be entrenched in international law.81 Yet, 
despite this caution-invoking standard, the Court still sanctioned the 
possibility of bringing ATS suits for the years to come. 
 
B. The Rise of Corporate Liability under the ATS 
 
One issue the Supreme Court definitely ruled on in Sosa was 
liability for corporations.82 Like Filartiga, the defendant in Sosa was a 
former government official.83 Therefore, the facts did not lend 
themselves to Supreme Court commentary over who a trespasser need 
be for purposes of ATS litigation. Yet, prior to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Sosa, foreign plaintiffs had already begun to bring suits 
against non-government actors.84  
 
                                                 
77 Id. at 747. 
78 Id. at 743. 
79 Id. at 724. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 In its infamous footnote, the Supreme Court noted that, “whether 
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or 
individual.” Id. at 732 n.20. As will be discussed below in Part (III)(B),this dicta did 
not definitely hold or exclude corporations from potential liability under the ATS. 
83 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878(2d. Cir. 1980); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 
692. 
84 See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d. Cir. 2002). 
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1. Doe I v. Unocal Corp. and the Aiding and Abetting Cases  
 
The first reported case in which foreign plaintiffs availed 
themselves of the ATS to sue corporations for international law 
violations was Doe I v. Unocal Corp.85 In Doe I, the Ninth Circuit 
entertained a claim against a corporation for egregious violations of 
international conventions against forced labor and torture.86 The Ninth 
Circuit found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether 
the corporation could have been liable for aiding and abetting 
government actions that subjected plaintiffs to forced labor, torture, 
rape, and summary execution.87 The court also found that the 
corporation could be held liable for international law violations and 
remanded the case to the district court for that determination.88 
Consistent with the ruling in Doe I, the Second Circuit ruled in 2002, 
in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., that the ATS confers 
jurisdiction over multinational corporations that collaborate with 
governments and aid and abet those governments in committing 
international law violations.89 
 
2. Cases Seeking Direct Corporate Liability:  
State Action Not Required 
 
All cases originally filed against corporate defendants were 
brought under the ATS, but the claim was that the corporations had 
aided and abetted some government actor to violate international 
law.90 However, the foreign plaintiffs in a recent case, Abdullahi v. 
Pfizer, Inc., brought claims alleging that the corporation itself had 
                                                 
85 Doe. I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
86 Id. at 936. 
87 Id. at 953. 
88 Id. at 963. 
89 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(also known as the South African Apartheid Litigation). 
90 E.g. Doe I, 395 F.3d 932.  
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violated international law.91 The plaintiffs claimed that a 
pharmaceutical company had tested certain medication on village 
children without any parental consent, and that the nonconsensual 
testing violated international law.92 Writing for the majority in 
Abdullahi, Judge Parker reiterated the Supreme Court’s cautious 
merits review test which it laid out in Sosa: 
 
[R]emaining mindful of our obligation to proceed cautiously 
and self-consciously in this area, we determine whether the 
norm alleged (1) is a norm of international character that 
States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of 
legal obligation; (2) is defined with a specificity comparable 
to the 18th-century paradigms discussed in Sosa; and (3) is of 
mutual concern to States.93 
 
The majority found the pharmaceutical company to be potentially 
liable, but remanded the case to the district court for consideration of 
whether nonconsensual testing met the level of recognition of 
customary international law that Sosa requires.94  
The dissent strongly critiqued the majority’s omission of Pfizer’s 
corporate identity when it considered whether ATS jurisdiction 
applied. The dissent proposed that the majority deviated from the 
Supreme Court’s guidance in Sosa by doing so.95 In his dissent, Judge 
Wesley stated: 
 
[T]he Supreme Court has required courts deciding whether a 
principle is a customary international law norm to consider 
“whether international law extends the scope of liability for a 
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the 
                                                 
91 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 3541, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1121 (2010). 
92 Id. at 168. 
93 Id. at 174. 
94 Id. at 177. 
95 Id. at 194 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
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defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or 
individual.” . . . [T]he majority's analysis would be no 
different if Plaintiffs had sued the Nigerian government, 
instead of, or in addition to, Pfizer. Such a broad, simplified 
definition ignores the clear admonitions of the Supreme 
Court—and conflicts with prior decisions of this Court—that 
a customary international law norm cannot be divorced from 
the identity of its violator.96 
 
Judge Wesley’s dissenting rationale in Abdullahi would be 
embraced by the Second Circuit one year later in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Corp.97 Both cases attempted to bring the issue of 
corporate liability under the ambit of the Supreme Court’s merits 
review.98 As subsequent litigation demonstrates, the Supreme Court’s 
merits review requirement coupled with its language in the infamous 
footnote twenty of the case would become the source of the current 
misconception that corporate liability needs to derive precedent from 
international law.99 
The trend of holding private parties, such as corporations, directly 
liable for international law violations committed without the 
requirement of state action stems from Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic.100 It was later expanded upon in Kadic v. Karadzic.101 Both 
                                                 
96 Id. at 193–94 (citation omitted). 
97 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127-128 (2d Cir. 2010), 
reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
98 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724. Both cases rely heavily, if 
not solely, on the Supreme Court’s dicta in footnote twenty of the case. Id. at 732 
n.20. 
99 See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
100 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Tel-
Oren, the plaintiffs brought claims against the Palestine Liberation Organization 
which the D.C. Circuit held no to be a recognized state. Id. at 791. Because the PLO 
was not a recognized state, the defendants could not be acting under color of law in 
the manner in which the Paraguayan official had in Filartiga. Id. The court reasoned 
that there are a handful of crimes to which “the law of nations attributes individual 
responsibility,” although it did not find non-state torture to be one of those crimes. 
Id. at 795; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d. Cir. 1995) (noting that 
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cases held that jus cogens102 violations did not require state action. In 
Kadic, the court held:  
 
“[A]cts of rape, torture, and summary execution,” like most 
crimes, “are proscribed by international law only when 
committed by state officials or under color of law” to the 
extent that they were committed in isolation, these crimes 
“are actionable under the Alien Tort [Claims] Act, without 
regard to state action, to the extent that they were committed 
in pursuit of genocide or war crimes.”103  
 
The court in Doe I v. Unocal Corp. found forced labor to be a 
variant of slavery so in the same vein as the Kadic holding, crimes of 
forced labor would not require state action.104 By doing so, the Ninth 
Circuit began a trend that corporations may be directly liable under the 
ATS without aiding and abetting state action. 
 
C. Current Decisions on Corporate Liability under the ATS:  
Who Said What and Why 
 
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.:  
Corporate Immunity for International Law Violations 
 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. Co., is the most recent Second 
Circuit case where, in a detour from its previous precedent, the Second 
Circuit expressly held that customary international law did not extend 
                                                                                                                   
Filartiga found official torture to be a violation of customary international law) 
(emphasis in original). 
101 Kadic, 70 F.3d 232. 
102 Violations of jus cogens include slavery, genocide and war crimes. 
Courtney Shaw, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1359, 1362, 1370 nn.82, 83 (June 2002). 
103 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243–44 (citation omitted). 
104 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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to corporations.105 In short, the Second Circuit concluded that because 
international law does not apply to corporations, the ATS could not be 
used as a basis to confer jurisdiction over corporations.106 An appeal is 
currently before the Supreme Court, which will rule on the case this 
term.107 
 
a. The Facts 
 
In Kiobel, Nigerian plaintiffs filed a claim in the Southern District 
of New York against British, Dutch, and Nigerian corporations for 
allegedly aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in committing 
human rights abuses.108 The corporations were present in the Ogoni 
region of Nigeria to explore and exploit oil.109 The plaintiffs alleged 
that the corporate defendants hired the Nigerian government to clear 
out village opposition to gas exploration in the Ogoni region.110 The 
plaintiffs also alleged that the corporations aided the government 
officials who engaged in extrajudicial killings; torture; cruel, 
inhumane and degrading treatment of villagers; property deprivation; 
and forced exile.111 The district court dismissed certain counts on the 
grounds that the violations alleged did not meet the specificity 
requirement set forth in Sosa and certified an appeal for those issues 
not dismissed.112 On appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ remaining claims on the grounds that corporations could not 
be held civilly liable under international law.113   
 
                                                 
105 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrolium Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), 
reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
106 Id.  
107 See footnote 6 above. 
108 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123.  
109 Id. 
110 Id.  
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 124. 
113 Id.  
46 
19
Angulo: New Civil Liability for Corporations: The Seventh Circuit Takes a
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                             Volume 7, Issue 1                               Fall 2011 
 
 b. Kiobel’s Majority Opinion 
 
Writing for the majority, Judge Cabranes set out several premises 
justifying what is essentially corporate immunity against ATS claims. 
First, the majority opinion stated that the corporation must be liable for 
the violation under international law standards.114 The majority 
reasoned that the Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa requires lower 
courts to look beyond domestic law and into international law to 
determine the possibility of corporate liability.115 In looking to 
international law, the majority noted that international law historically 
has a penchant against instituting corporate liability for violations of 
customary international law.116 The majority’s main contention was 
that corporations cannot be liable for violations of international law 
because there is no standard for criminal corporate punishment in 
either international law or domestic laws.117 As an example, the Judge 
Cabranes looked to international criminal tribunals including the 
                                                 
114 Id. at 118; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 
(2004). 
115 “[I]n Sosa the Supreme Court instructed the lower federal courts to consider 
‘whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given 
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a 
corporation or individual’ . . . That language requires that we look to international 
law to determine our jurisdiction over ATS claims against a particular type of 
defendant such as corporations.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127(citations omitted). The 
Kiobel court additionally emphasizes the judicial precedent based on Sosa in looking 
to the particular defendant’s identity: “We have looked to international law to 
determine whether state officials, private individuals, and aiders and abettors can be 
held liable under the ATS. There is no principled basis for treating the question of 
corporate liability differently.” Id. at 130 (citations omitted). 
116 The court explained:  
“customary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate 
liability for international crimes, and no international tribunal has ever held a 
corporation liable for a violation of the law of nations”. Id. at 120. This proposition 
is vehemently rejected in the concurrence, which calls it internally and inherently 
inconsistent with prior Supreme Court decisions and prior case law. Id. at 152 
(Leval, J., concurring). 
117 Id. at 147; contra Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human 
Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. U. J.INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008). 
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Nuremberg trials and highlighted the absence of holding corporations 
liable for international law violations in these tribunals.118 The court 
highlighted that responsibility for customary international law 
violations cannot be “divorced” from individual moral 
responsibility.119 The court also looked to international treaties noting 
that no treaty has codified corporate liability.120 As a result, the 
majority concluded that sources of international law do not reveal 
corporate liability to be a customary international law norm 
recognized by civilized nations.121 Because corporate liability is not a 
norm of customary international law, the court held the ATS to be 
inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ claims against the corporate 
defendants.122 
 
c. Kiobel’s Concurring Opinion 
 
The Kiobel decision was unanimous. However, Judge Leval wrote 
a lengthy concurrence in which he meticulously rejected each point the 
majority propounded in reaching its controversial conclusion. Judge 
Leval stated, “[a]ccording to the rule my colleagues have created, one 
who earns profits by commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental 
                                                 
118 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 133, 136 (noting that the Nuremberg Tribunal, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda all confined tribunal jurisdiction to natural persons 
only). To the extent that that the majority opinion considered the lack of precedent 
for corporate accountability in criminal tribunals, the concurrence notes the 
irrelevancy of what happens in a criminal forum to the precedent for civil corporate 
liability under the ATS—a civil statute. Id. at 152 (Leval, J., concurring). 
119 Id. at 135. 
120 Id. at 137. 
121 Id. at 148–49. 
122 The court noted: “No corporation has ever been subject to any form of 
liability (whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary international law 
of human rights. Rather, sources of customary international law have, on several 
occasions, explicitly rejected the idea of corporate liability. Thus, corporate liability 
has not attained a discernable, much less universal, acceptance among nations of the 
world in their relations inter se, and it cannot not, as a . . .  result, form the basis of a 
suit under the ATS.” Id.(emphasis in original). 
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human rights can successfully shield those profits from victims’ claims 
for compensation simply by taking the precaution of conducting the 
heinous operation in the corporate form.”123 Judge Leval’s position 
was that the ATS is an act that imposes civil liability, and that, 
therefore, global precedent for criminal corporate liability is 
irrelevant.124 Civil liability for corporations is allowed because the 
punishment serves the end goal of compensating damaged victims.125 
On the other hand, the goal of criminal punishment is a punitive one, 
and criminal punishment of corporations cannot punish.126 
Accordingly, to Judge Leval, the majority’s rationale was flawed, and 
corporate liability should attach under ATS.127 
 
2. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 
 
The year after the Second Circuit ruled in Kiobel, the D.C. Circuit 
took its turn to consider the issue of aiding and abetting liability for 
corporations in Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp.128 The D.C. Circuit 
distinguished between the Sosa analysis required for international law 
norms and that of corporate liability.129 Noting corporate liability to be 
a completely different issue from those considered in Sosa, the D.C. 
Circuit avoids considering the “wrong question” of whether customary 
international law establishes corporate liability as considered in 
Kiobel.130 The D.C. Circuit identified corporate liability as an issue of 
agency law.131 To the D.C. Circuit, the issue is whether corporations 
                                                 
123 Id. at 149–50 (Leval, J., concurring). 
124 Id. at 169 (Leval, J., concurring). 
125 Id. (Leval, J., concurring). 
126 Id. at 152 (Leval, J., concurring). 
127 See id. at 196. 
128 Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
129 Id. at 41. 
130 Id. (“Our conclusion differs from that of the Second Circuit in Kiobel 
because its analysis conflates the norms of conduct issue in Sosa and the rules for 
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can be held liable to pay money damages for the violations of 
international law that their agents commit.132 Labeling corporate 
liability as an accoutrement to causes of action under the ATS, the 
D.C. Circuit noted that because international law does not provide any 
civil remedies or private causes of action, federal courts must turn to 
federal common law to determine whether corporations can be held 
liable.133 U.S. agency law provides for corporate liability.134 Next, the 
D.C. Circuit considered the text of the ATS, which it noted “does not 
distinguish among classes of defendants.”135 The court also considered 
the historical context of the enactment of the ATS, and indicated that 
nothing suggests that the First Congress would have allowed 
corporations to escape the liability it was trying to impose on 
individuals under the ATS.136 Instead, the Court highlighted, corporate 
liability was an accepted principle of tort at the time the ATS was 
enacted in 1789, and that therefore, corporate liability today is actually 
consistent with the original intent behind enacting the ATS.137 The 
court also considered the fact that numerous international treaties 
provide that juridical actors such as corporations must comply with 
international law.138 Finally, the D.C. Circuit claimed that Kiobel 
ignored the Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa that federal common law 
would supply the remedy for ATS claims to the extent that the tort is 
determined by federal common law.139 The D.C. Circuit’s extensive 
analysis of corporate liability in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. provided a 
sound basis on which the Seventh Circuit could follow. 
 
 
                                                 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 41–42. 
134 Id. at 56. 
135 Id. at 43. 
136 Id. at 47. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 48–49. 
139 Id. at 54–55. 
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II. FLOMO V. FIRESTONE NATURAL RUBBER CO.: 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CHIMES IN 
 
A. The Facts 
 
On April 19, 2006, a case similar to the ATS suits filed around the 
country was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana.140 In that suit, twenty-three Liberian plaintiffs 
alleged international law violations of forced labor against Firestone 
Natural Rubber Company (“Firestone”).141 Firestone owned and 
operated approximately 118,000 acres of rubber tree plantations in 
Liberia.142 It employed local natives to extract latex from the rubber 
trees.143 These employees, known as tappers, had to meet a daily quota 
of 650 trees per day in order to keep their jobs, and so, the tappers 
required their children to help—anything to avoid “joining the ranks of 
the starving unemployed.”144 When the plaintiffs brought claims of 
human rights violations against Firestone, the district court dismissed 
all of the claims except for the children’s claim brought by their 
parents as next friends that they were subjected to the “worst form” of 
child labor under various international conventions.145 The district 
court held that this claim was actionable under the ATS. 146 Moreover, 
while the plaintiffs’ claim on child labor proceeded, the Second Circuit 
decided Kiobel.147 Firestone filed a motion for summary judgment, 
and absent any Seventh Circuit guidance on the issue,148 the Southern 
                                                 
140 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co. (“Flomo I”), 744 F.Supp.2d 810 
(S.D.Ind. 2010), and (“Flomo II”), No. 1:06-cv-00627-JMS-TAB, 2010 WL 
4174583, at *1 (S.D. Ind., Oct. 19, 2010). 
141 Flomo II, 2010 WL 4174583, at *2. 
142 Flomo I, 643 F.3d at 1015. 
143 Flomo II, 2010 WL 4174583, at *2. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at *3. 
146 Id. 
147 Flomo I, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 812. 
148 Flomo II, 2010 WL 4174583, at *2. 
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District of Indiana relied on Kiobel’s holding that corporations could 
not be sued under the ATS to grant the motion.149 
 
B. The Appeal 
 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit engaged in a two-fold analysis, 
determining first, whether non-natural persons can be defendants 
under the ATS, and second, whether the evidence presented in the case 
could establish that Firestone had violated customary international 
law.150 While the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for 
Firestone due to lacking evidence establishing international law 
violations at the level required by Sosa, 151 it expressly rejected the 
district court’s holding that corporations could not be sued.152 Judge 
Posner, writing for a unanimous court, stated, “[t]he factual premise of 
the majority opinion in the Kiobel case is incorrect.”153 The court 
specifically rejected Kiobel’s logic that corporations could not be 
liable for violations of international law because corporations have 
never been held criminally liable for such violations.154 Judge Posner 
                                                 
149 Id. In its supplemental opinion the district court also explained that 
Firestone was entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiffs had not presented 
factual evidence that could establish a viable claim of “worst form” of child labor. 
Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d. at 816. 
150 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co. (“Flomo III”), 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 
(7th Cir. 2011). 
151 Id. at 1024. 
152 Id. at 1025. 
153 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1017.  
154 Id. As a point of reference, the Second Circuit in Kiobel analogized to the 
Nuremberg Trials and to the lack of accountability for the corporations that aided 
Nazi Germany. Id. (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit also looked at the 
Nuremberg trials and concluded: “If a corporation complicit in Nazi war crimes 
could be punished criminally for violating customary international law, as we 
believe I could be, then a fortiori if the board of directors of a corporation direct, the 
corporation’s managers to commit war crimes, engage in piracy, abuse ambassadors, 
or use slave labor, the corporation could be civilly liable.” Id. at 1018 (citation 
omitted); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
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focused on the possibility of creating new precedent instead of relying 
on its absence.155 He reasoned: “Suppose no corporation had ever 
been punished for violating customary international law. There is 
always a first time for litigation to enforce a norm; there has to be. 
Before the Nuremberg Tribunal was created there were no 
multinational prosecutions for aggression and crimes against 
hum
as an analogous sibling to civil corporate liability under the 
ATS
criminal liability under international law.162 In fact, this argument 
                                                                                                                  
anity.”156  
In determining why corporations can be civilly liable for 
international law violations, Judge Posner laid out three main 
arguments.157 First, Judge Posner contended that at least some 
historical precedent for civil corporate liability in international law 
exists.158 Second, he stated that domestic law determines what 
remedies are available for customary international law violations.159 
Finally, Judge Posner reasoned that because domestic law does so, 
U.S. courts can consider civil and criminal liability for corporations in 
the U.S. 
.160  
After briefly recapping the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
customary international law in Sosa, Judge Posner considered 
Firestone’s argument that juridical persons’ conduct can never be a 
violation of international law.161 Firestone’s basis for this argument 
was that corporations, unlike individuals, have never been subject to 
 
(noting that the “Allies determined that I.G. Farben had committed violations of the 
law of nations and therefore destroyed it.”) (citation omitted). 
155 Flomo III, 642 F.3d at 1017.  
156 Id. (emphasis in original). 
157 Id. at 1018. 
158 Id. at 1021. 
159 Id. at 1020. 
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 1017 (“conduct by a corporation or any other entity that does not have 
a heartbeat…can never be a violation of customary international law, no matter how 
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formed a bulk of the majority’s opinion in Kiobel.163 But Judge Posner 
was quick to point out that the factual premise of the Kiobel opinion 
was incorrect.164 Judge Posner refuted the Second Circuit’s example 
that German corporations assisting the Nazi war effort were never 
criminally tried, and that, as a result, no criminal liability precedent for 
corporations exists.165 Notably, Judge Posner pointed out that the 
corporations were dissolved under authority of international law, and 
that the Allies’ Control Counsel and Coordinating Committee ordered 
seizure of the corporations’ assets and made some assets available to 
the victims for reparations.166 Additionally, Judge Posner points to 
18th-century in rem judgments against pirate ships to demonstrate 
some historical precedent for civil liability of corporations, if one is 
sought.167 In conclusion, Judge Posner’s first contention was that there 
is not a complete void of international precedent for corporate civil 
liability.168 
Next, Judge Posner considered why criminal corporate liability 
compliments civil corporate liability in the U.S. The essence of the 
court’s argument is that domestic law determines what kinds of 
remedies are available for international law violations.169 Although the 
court acknowledged that criminal corporate liability is a uniquely 
Anglo-American concept, it dispensed with the notion of such liability 
                                                 
163 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,131–45 (2d Cir. 2010), 
reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
164 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1017. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. (citation omitted). 
167 Id. at 1018. Admittedly, the argument is more of a reference than an 
analytical comparison. 
168 Judge Posner does admit that even in the complete absence of historical 
precedent for corporate civil liability, there is always “a first time for litigation to 
enforce a norm; there has to be.” Id. at 1017. 
169 Id. at 1020; see also Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 651 F.3d 11, 22 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that the 
ATS “establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law 
remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law”). 
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being anomalous.170 Because we cannot imprison a corporation, courts 
will fine corporations that commit criminal acts—through their board 
of directors or other employees.171 While criminal liability is critiqued, 
Judge Posner noted that we continue to use it in the United States and 
that we would use it even more if civil liability were unavailable.172 
He also noted that international resistance to corporate liability is 
quickly eroding.173 According to Judge Posner, civil liability follows 
any action that is criminally liable, and, in the absence of the 
possibility of criminal liability, civil liability should be the very least 
imposed on corporations.174 As a secondary policy consideration to 
support this point, Judge Posner pointed out that the possibility of 
suing a corporation makes available the resources to compensate the 
victims that would not be available were the corporations’ board 
members the only potential defendants.175 
In conclusion, Flomo emphasized that: (1) domestic tribunals such 
as U.S. courts are the proper forum for remedial considerations 
stemming from civil liability;176 (2) that individual nations decide how 
to impose the substantive obligations set out in international law;177 
and (3) that even certain international treaties authorize domestic 
enforcement of customary international law violations, criminal and 
                                                 
170 See Dodge, supra note 16 (noting that William Blackstone wrote 
extensively on England’s criminal punishment for individuals committing customary 
international law violations as early as the eighteenth century). 
171 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1019. 
172 Id. 
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 1020 (“Justice Breyer has opined that ‘universal criminal jurisdiction 
necessarily contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d. Cir. 1995)). 
177 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1019 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398, 422–23 (1965)). 
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civil.178 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit concluded that corporate 
liability is possible under the ATS, but that in this case the plaintiffs 
had not pleaded sufficient facts to establish the actual existence of 
forced labor on the rubber plantation.179 
 
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT & WHY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
RULED CORRECTLY 
 
Aside from a reference or two, the Seventh Circuit does not attack 
Kiobel’s analysis head on. Instead, the Seventh Circuit choose a few 
limited points on which to base its opinion. These points are: (1) that 
international law supports civil liability for corporations through 
eroding resistance to criminal liability, the existence of which would 
necessarily entail an acceptance of international civil liability;180 and 
(2) that international law requires enforcement in the domestic arena 
and sanctions domestic determination of remedies.  
 
A. Eroding Resistance to criminal corporate sanctions  
may engender acceptance of civil corporate liability  
within the international community even if it does not exist today. 
 
In Flomo, Judge Posner suggested that the reticence toward 
criminally and civilly prosecuting punishable corporations in the 
international sphere could stem from an historical desire to retain 
prosecution for the worst forms of international law violations.181 As 
an example, he used the prosecution of Nazi war criminals during the 
                                                 
178 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1019 (using as an example the OECD Convention on 
Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, arts. 2, 3).  
179 Id. at 1021. 
180 Id. at 1020 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.692, 763 (2004) 
(Breyer, J., concurring)). 
181 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1018 (“[I]t seems rather that the paucity of cases 
reflects a desire to keep liability, whether personal or institutional, for [international 
law] violations within tight bounds by confining it to abhorrent conduct-the kind of 
conduct that invites criminal sanctions”). 
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Nuremberg Trials.182 Judge Posner noted, “it was natural that a 
tradition would develop of punishing violations of customary 
international law by means of national or international criminal 
proceedings; it was a way of underscoring the gravity of violating 
customary international law.”183 However, the tradition to keep 
corporate liability separate from criminal prosecution of government 
officials184 has begun to chip at the edges.185 For example, criminal 
responsibility for non-state actors who aid and abet international law 
violations “has been accepted as one of the core principles of the post-
World War II war crimes trials.”186 Furthermore, scholarship has 
revealed that the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Rome 
treaty, omitted juridical persons from mandatory jurisdiction of the 
court for purposes for practical purposes.187 Since few countries in the 
world currently allow criminal corporate responsibility, but all signing 
countries are bound by the Rome statute, criminal corporate 
responsibility under the Rome Treaty would have applied to countries 
where criminal corporate responsibility is not embraced.188 As this is a 
difficult issue, the five-week period allotted to negotiating the Rome 
Treaty was insufficient to fully compromise on the matter.189 This lead 
Professor Doug Cassel, to state that, “the opposition was not so much 
on principle as on grounds of practicality: there was no time during the 
                                                 
182 Id.  
183 Id. 
184 See Cassel, supra note 117, at 44 (noting that the Nuremberg Charter allows 
the denomination of corporations or groups as criminal but not at the trial of an 
“individual.”). Cassel also notes that most tribunals have jurisdiction over natural 
persons only. Id. 
185 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1019 (“It is neither surprising nor significant that 
corporate liability hasn’t figured in prosecutions of war criminals and other violators 
of customary international law”). 
186 Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d, 11, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation 
omitted). 
187 Cassel, supra note 117, at 46. 
188 Id. 
189 Id.  
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five-week Rome conference to revise domestic legislation.”190 In 
short, the contention of Kiobel and the one that Firestone relies on (so 
did Exxon Mobil in the D.C. Circuit), is that international law does not 
apply to corporations absent certain exceptions.191 To Judge Posner, 
this absence of prosecutorial zeal is not a sufficient basis on which to 
exonerate corporations from criminal and civil liability.192 In fact, 
Judge Posner hypothesized: “Suppose it’s the case that the only 
actionable violations of customary international law . . . are acts so 
maleficent that criminal punishment would be an appropriate sanction 
for the actors. It would not follow that civil sanctions would be 
improper.”193  
Additionally, while criminal corporate liability does not exist in 
many countries outside of the United States,194 and while criminal 
liability is a peripheral form of social control in other countries, the 
resistance to apply criminal liability to corporations is eroding within 
                                                 
190 Id. at 47. 
191 Douglas M. Branson, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable? 
Achilles Heel in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 227, 
283 (2011) (noting that “in the main, the law of nations, applies to nations, but in 
cases of certain grave acts (involuntary servitude, genocide) the law of nations 
applies to jus cogens offenses”).  
192 Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co. (“Flomo III”), 643 F.3d 1010, 1019 
(7th Cir. 2011) (“That doesn’t mean corporations are exempt from [customary 
international law]”); see also Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of 
International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 35 n.135 (2011) (“One need not 
agree with . . . expert opinions that the absence of explicit international law examples 
making corporations criminally liable establishes that no ATCA liability is possible . 
. . Even assuming that under the ATCA, this aspect of a viable claim is to be 
determined by international and not U.S. law, the question that might be posed is 
whether international law precludes finding corporate liability not whether it 
explicitly authorizes it.”)(citations omitted). 
193 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1020. 
194 See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal 
Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 142, (October 2008) (noting that Germany, for 
example, only has administrative sanctions for corporate transgressions). 
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the international community.195 Several international treaties and 
conventions now incorporate provisions for both criminal and civil 
responsibility.196 Beginning with the OECD Convention against 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, a trend towards imposing criminal responsibility on 
corporations has been contagious.197 This increased existence and 
acceptance of criminal liability for corporations leads to a similar 
acceptance of civil liability. In his concurring opinion in Sosa, Justice 
Breyer noted that “universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily 
contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well.”198 
Finally, criminal corporate responsibility is seen as a policy tool to 
provide some reparation where civil damages might not be 
available.199 The Seventh Circuit differs in this respect from Judge 
Leval’s concurrence in Kiobel, where Judge Leval claims that criminal 
punishment of corporations is irrelevant to ATS analysis because the 
goals of criminal punishment cannot apply to corporations.200 The 
Seventh Circuit asserts otherwise.201 From a policy perspective, the 
Seventh Circuit contends that in fact, civil damages require harm, and 
criminal punishment can provide justice in cases where no harm is 
materialized but where the conduct was nonetheless abhorrent.202 
                                                 
195 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1019; see also Cassel, supra note 117, at 48 (noting 
the emerging international law trend to impose criminal liability on corporate 
actors). 
196 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1020. 
197 Cassel, supra note117, at 48. 
198 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1020 (citation omitted).  
199 Id. 
200 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 167 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Leval, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 
S. Ct. 472 (2011); see also Part (I)(C) above.  
201 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1018 (“Criminal punishment of corporations that 
commit crimes is not anomalous merely because a corporation cannot be imprisoned 
or executed. It can be fined”). 
202 Id. (noting examples such as fraud where shareholders cannot prove 
causation, or misrepresenting efficacy of drugs where buyers are not harmed because 
no other alternative drug could have worked anyway). 
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Criminal punishment cannot punish a corporation through 
imprisonment, but it can achieve a punitive end through fines.203  
The erosion of criminal punishment of corporations demonstrates 
the trend amongst the international community that as a remedy, the 
international community does embrace criminal sanctions. If the 
international community embraces criminal sanctions, which have a 
higher threshold of acceptance, it only follows that it would also 
embrace civil liability. 
 
B. International Law leaves the determination of remedies to the 
domestic sphere.  
 
Notwithstanding the international community’s increasing 
emphasis on criminal corporate responsibility, international law does 
leave the enforcement of international law violations to the domestic 
sphere.204 This is Judge Posner’s second point in Flomo. 205 To fully 
understand his analysis, it is critical to point out a much-discussed 
“distinction” that permeates ATS litigation cases.206 This distinction 
involves separating a question of whether a norm is recognized and 
accepted as customary international law among nations,207 and 
whether a remedy exists when corporations are the actors that happen 
                                                 
203 Id. at 1019. 
204 DUNOFF, supra note 41, at 243 (“International law frequently says little 
about how governments should implement their international legal obligations”). 
205 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1020 (citation omitted). 
206 See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“The dissent’s objection to corporate liability . . . disregards both a fundamental 
distinction between causes of action based on conduct that violates [international 
law] and the remedy under domestic law, and a source of international law”); Flomo, 
643 F.3d at 1019 (“We keep harping on criminal liability for violations of customary 
international law in order to underscore the distinction between a principle of that 
law, which is a matter of substance, and the means of enforcing it, which a  matter of 
procedure or remedy”). 
207 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
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to violate that norm.208 As the D.C. Circuit noted, Sosa only touched 
on the first point.209 Considering the first prong of the distinction, in 
Sosa, the Supreme Court highlighted the requirement that, to establish 
jurisdiction under the ATS, a reviewing court should determine 
whether a norm is one of customary international law—that is, “of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century 
paradigms we have recognized.”210 Such a merits review requires a 
district court to consider whether state practice on the international 
level condemns the particular underlying tort. Thus, the merits review 
applies international law to the underlying cause of action—torture, 
extrajudicial killings, nonconsensual medical testing or forced labor, 
for example—but not to the prospective class of defendants.211 This is 
distinct from determining whether corporations are subject to 
responsibility for violating these norms.212 
The second prong of the distinction implicates some international 
law theory.  International law does not operate in a vacuum.213 It is a 
structure that governs individual sovereigns who keep that sovereignty 
with respect instead of being mandatorily subjected to it. As a result, 
international law depends on those sovereign nation states to 
implement it by incorporating it into their domestic law.214  The 
Supreme Court in Sosa reiterated that remedies is a common area 
where domestic law and international law overlap: “The law of nations 
generally does not create private causes of action to remedy its 
                                                 
208 See generally Doe VIII, 654 F.3d 11. This is precisely where the Kiobel 
court faltered in its analysis. The Second Circuit conflates the issue of merits review 
with that of determining liability for corporations. Id. at 41.  
209 Id. at 18. 
210 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
211 Id. 
212 See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41. 
213 See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co. (“Flomo III”), 643 F.3d 1010, 1015 
(7th Cir. 2011) (“[c]ustomary international law is discerned from myriad decisions 
made in numerous and varied international and domestic arenas.”) (quoting Flores v. 
Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248–49 (2d. Cir. 2003)) . 
214 DUNOFF, supra note 41, at 239.  
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violations, but leaves to each national the task of defining remedies 
that are available.”215  
In Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil, the D.C. circuit entertained a 
thorough analysis of the issue, noting that, “[t]he law of 
nations . . . creates no civil remedies and no private right of action that 
federal courts must determine the nature of any remedy in lawsuits 
alleging violations of the law of nations by reference to federal 
common law rather than customary international law.”216 Judge 
Rogers, writing the majority opinion, proceeded to cite Professor 
Louis Henkin, “a leading authority on international law” who stated, 
“International law itself does not require any particular reaction to 
violation of law . . . whether and how the United States should react to 
such violations are domestic, political questions: the court will not 
assume any particular reaction, remedy or consequence.”217 Because 
international law leaves the determination of remedies to the 
individual nation states, domestic law determines whether corporations 
are to be subject to liability under the ATS. Thus, a reviewing court 
would need to consider domestic, not international precedent for 
corporate liability in ATS litigation. Corporate liability is not such a 
tort; therefore, there is no need to consider whether state practice on 
the international level condemns or accepts corporate liability.  
In Flomo, Judge Posner cited to specific examples that 
demonstrate that international law leaves the determination of 
remedies to the domestic sphere.218 For example, the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (OECD Convention) provides that 
“in the event that, under the legal system of a Party [to the 
Convention], criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, 
that Party shall ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including 
                                                 
215 Id. 
216 Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 42. 
217 Id. (citing to LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 245–46 (2d ed. 1996)). 
218 Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1020. 
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monetary sanctions, for bribery of foreign public officials.”219 The 
language of the Convention demonstrates that nation states are to 
choose and impose the necessary sanctions on international law 
transgressions since international law does not do this itself. Thus, 
nation states look to their own domestic law, in this case, U.S. federal 
common law to do so.220 As is seen in the OECD Convention, 
determining whether corporations are liable, criminally or civilly, is a 
remedial issue that is left to the nation states.221 
The Seventh Circuit considered whether corporations are a class 
of defendants that the ATS can reach. Once the Seventh Circuit carved 
out this discreet issue, it is able to answer it quickly as the issue is 
rather straightforward. Under U.S. federal common law, corporations 





The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of why corporations should be 
liable under the ATS is certainly unconventional: the decision is short; 
it is conspicuously void of Erie analysis and jurisdictional questions 
that occupy a place in other analyses; and it is considers policy 
implications. Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Flomo 
squares with those opinions that incorporate other branches of analysis 
such as the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. The 
Seventh Circuit’s holding can be seen as a unique outlook that really 
focuses in on the discreet issue of why corporations can be subject to 
liability under the ATS. And, while the court does not jump through 
the conventional hoops, it does cover all the bases.  
The issue of corporate liability under the ATS is merely one 
consideration in the development ATS jurisprudence, yet it is such an 
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64 
important consideration because it opens the door to possible 
expansion of international law by the domestic system. At the same 
time, international mechanisms for corporate accountability are few in 
number. The ATS might just be a way to encourage corporate 
responsibility. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Flomo v. Firestone 
Natural Rubber Co. correctly held corporations to be accountable for 
their international law transgressions under the ATS. Flomo’s 
conclusion is clear: holding that a corporation can be sued under the 
ATS is by no means an automatic guarantee that a plaintiff will collect 
damages from the corporation. Corporate liability under ATS is 
reserved for the most egregious violations of well-entrenched and 
internationally-recognized violations. Thus, the ATS simultaneously 
protects against completely barring foreign plaintiffs’ claims while 
safeguarding against abuse of the statute. Notwithstanding that foreign 
plaintiffs now have an extra tool in their legal toolbox to seek 
reparation from corporations in certain U.S. circuits, uniformity 
among the circuits is required. This uniformity should come in the 
form of Supreme Court ruling that holds corporations liable under the 
ATS where the facts support such liability. 
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